MODEL LETTER TO HOME GOVERNMENT – TO BE SENT BY AI ONLY OR WITH NGO PARTNERS

US Ambassador

US Embassy

Laufásvegur 21
101 Reykjavík = ; &n= bsp; = ; &n= bsp; = ; Reykjavík 14.05.2010

Your Excellency

As your government prepares for the first sessi= on of the Preparatory Committee to deliberate on the content of an internation= al Arms Trade Treaty in July 2010, we write to stress the urgent need for an effective treaty that will stop irresponsible arms transfers. As a globally significant participant in the international arms trade, and with one of the most developed and well-resourced national arms transfer control systems in= the world, the USA clearly has a particularly significant role to play in these Treaty deliberations. We urge you to use this role to respond to the needs of those who bear the human cost of the irresponsible arms trade.<= /p>

This week, from 10 to 16 May, civil society organisations in over 110 countries across Africa, Asia, the Americas and Europe= are reminding governments that the poorly regulated global trade in conventional arms and ammunition has an enormous human cost. Every day, thousands of people are killed, injured, raped and forced to flee from their homes as a result of conflict, armed violence, and human rights violations = and abuses perpetrated using conventional arms. Inadequate and loophole-ridden regulation of international transfers of conventional arms permits such weapons, equipment and munitions to be supplied to those violating human rights, destroying lives and threatening livelihoods Some of these devastat= ing effects are summarised in the accompanying document: “Killer Facts: the impact of the irresponsible arms trade on lives, rights and livelihoods= .”

The Arms Trade Treaty will address a glaring ga= p in international law. While there are treaties to regulate the international t= rade of many products, from bananas to dinosaur bones, there are no global rules= for the trade in conventional weapons: products specifically designed to kill a= nd injure. We welcome the USA’s landmark commitment in October 2009 to address this gap, “actively pursuing a strong and robust treaty that contains the highest possible, leg= ally binding standards for the international transfer of conventional weapons.&#= 8221;

We believe that a “strong and robust” treaty with “the highest possible common international standards”, as mandated by UN General Assembly resolution 64/48, = is one that prevents international transfers of conventional arms where there = is credible and reliable information indicating a substantial risk that the intended recipient is likely to use those arms to commit or facilitate grav= e harm, including:

·        serious violations of international human rights law or international humanitarian law,

·        acts of genocide or crimes against humanity,

·        terrorist attacks,

·        gross and systematic armed crime and violence,<= o:p>

·        actions that seriously undermine poverty eradic= ation objectives.

The treaty must require states to undertake a rigorous risk assessment when considering transferring weapons to another state. Where the risk of huma= n harm is too high, the transfer must be prohibited.

We note that the USA shares many of these prio= rities, and that you share our concern that weak criteria simply requiring states to ‘take into account’ or ‘consider’ these impacts will fail to address the insecurity and human cost generated by irresponsible ar= ms transfers. The US’ stat= ement to the second Open Ended Working Group on the feasibility of an ATT, in July 2009, states that the US will not support an agreement “that would pe= rmit other states to support or breed instability, unrest, gross violations of h= uman rights, or terrorism while hiding behind the patina of an ineffective or incompetent international document”. We urge the US to b= uild upon this statement to work actively for to establish risk-assessment crite= ria in an ATT set at a meaningful level.

We also recognise that the USAR= 17;s national arms transfer laws and systems are amongst the most comprehensive and robustly-enforced in the world. We urge the US government to use their ro= le as a leader in transfer control mechanisms to ensure that the Arms Trade Treat= y is similarly comprehensive. To be effective the Arms Trade Treaty must regulate the global trade of:

·        all types of conventional military, security and police armaments, weapons and related materiel, including small arms and li= ght weapons;

·        conventional ammunition and explosives used for= the aforementioned;

·        weapons, ammunition and equipment deployed in t= he use of force by police and security forces;

·        components, expertise and equipment essential f= or the production, maintenance and use of the aforementioned; and

·        dual-use items that can have a military, securi= ty and police application.

To avoid loopholes, the Treaty must also regula= te all types of international transfer (import, export, transit, gifts, loans = and other transfers) and the transactions essential for a transfer in each case (including brokering activity).

Transparency in the international arms trade mu= st be enhanced through robust reporting and record-keeping provisions. To ensure effective implementation= , the Treaty should provide enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms, and procedures for international cooperation and assistance. This is also an ar= ea in which US experience and expertise could help generate robust ATT provisi= ons, as was clearly recognised in the statement of Under-Secretary for Arms Cont= rol and International Security Ellen Tauscher in Washington D.C.<= /st1:place> on 18 February 2010.

Please use the forthcoming UN Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings in July to signal your government’s intent to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty with these essential elements. Finally, we urge you = to ensure that this first PrepCom goes beyond discussing relatively unproblema= tic or administrative aspects of the Treaty. As you are aware, the scheduled PrepComs currently provide only 120 hours to develop a highly complex international instrument. The first session, from 12-23 July 2010, constitu= tes half of the total time available to develop the Treaty before the final Tre= aty negotiation. In order to develop a robust Treaty, the available time must be used to the fullest effect. We therefore urge you to be ambitious about the progress of this PrepCom, and to ensure that substantive text on key elemen= ts of the ATT is discussed, rather than simply dealing with preliminary 'easy' areas.

Yours sincerely,

Jóhanna K. Eyjólfsdóttir

Director

Amnesty International Icelandic Section